This article was written by Angus Harker a student at the University of Warwick. This article is part of his column 'The Other Side'.
A couple of weeks ago, my fellow columnist wrote a piece discussing just how close we are to WW3. Parallels were drawn to the war in Ukraine and the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in August 1914, in that both seem to be catalysts for something greater.
As a former student of modern history, I must disagree. In looking at historical events, it’s too easy to observe blithely and to try to find isolated parallels, before concluding that history repeats itself once more because of one single incident. History never repeats itself, but it very often rhymes; true analytical skill lies in finding which scheme it follows.
Having said that, it is a matter of observation that wars are so often started after a prolonged build up of problems reaching a crisis point, as Dheer so eloquently intimates. However, Ukraine is not the crisis point that sparks WW3; it is the fight that decides with what tools the next one will be fought with.
The Prelude
It’s a witty aphorism that has echoed throughout history; generals are always fighting the last war. This was especially the case in the First World War, when the Napoleonic era strategy of getting up and walking very slowly towards the enemy gave way to the brutality of trench fighting and chemical weapons. However, since that abysmal war with no real winners or losers, it has been the ambition of a few select nations to try to get the upper hand for the next. Advances in monoplane technology under the Nazis led to a supremacy of weaponry in the Luftwaffe, yet this new gear had to be tested - and what better place to use it than in Spain. Which they used to tremendous effect with the Spanish Civil War, developing aerial strategies to accommodate the monoplane’s speed and dexterity, to account for the next generation of fighter planes. Perhaps the most passionate depiction of their brutality came from Picasso’s Guernica, a heartfelt rendition of the destruction wrought on the eponymous city.
Ukraine had been preparing for war ever since the invasion of Crimea in 2014, for they knew long before anyone else did that Putin would not stop at Sevastopol. It was with this belief that they accepted the UK’s offer of help, and in 2015 Operation ORBITAL was set up. British military personnel, well trained in warfare drummed into them by their academies - and strengthened by a wealth of experience fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan - began training Ukrainian “military units into compliance of NATO member-states’ standard”. This move has been further consolidated since. This move can be seen in a kaleidoscope of different ways. For the Ukrainians, it shows that they were not going to take any chances in the likely event of war. Whilst that might have been shared by the British as well, I’m sure there are greater forces at stake than mere goodwill. On a more cynical note, most powers in the Northern Hemisphere haven’t been in a clear and outright war between nations since the Second World War. The Vietnam War was fought using guerilla tactics, the Gulf Wars were spent fighting forces that had suboptimal equipment and tactics. The only war Britain has fought with a sizable nation since WW2 has been with Argentina in the Falklands, over 40 years ago. Whilst most of Europe has advanced so massively in technology, we haven’t really been able to put it to the test against an equal adversary.
This is where the Ukrainian war comes into play. It is the first time that two roughly equal nations in the Northern Hemisphere are in direct conflict, putting strategies and tactics - as well as modern equipment - to the ultimate test.
The Battle
This came to a head during the initial phase of the war. In fact, it was a clear fight between old Soviet tactics and the next iteration of modern warfare. The best example of this was for the battle of Kyiv, when Russia employed a 35-mile long convoy that was essentially stopped in its tracks by carefully placed artillery, spectacular reconnaissance, and drone strikes. Whilst it is true that there are other elements at play, such as the woeful state of Russian tech in that convoy, and the use of outdated maps, it is still a fact that the march of thousands was gradually ground to a halt by a few good men. Amongst it being a victory for the Ukrainians, and a resounding embarrassment for Russia, it also showcased just how Europe was moving away from the last big war it fought.
The battle is now being fought on Russia’s terms, a meat grinder strategy that utilises mindfields and sheer numbers to overpower the enemy. This strategy comes straight from the Stalingrad playbook, but whilst it may work in Ukraine right now, its futility has been exposed with even small numbers of soldiers operating outside of where it is taking place. Russia cannot hope to survive a battle with NATO employing Second World War strategies, even if they are reinforced by North Korea. It represents a last-ditch attempt to try to find a Pyrrhic victory in lieu of an actual one. Simultaneously, however, Russia has no doubt understood what works in the field of battle.
Fight for the Future - the Nuclear Deterrent
A bone-chilling announcement by Vladimir Putin arose a couple of weeks ago, as he changed the criteria entailing the use of nuclear weapons to specify that non-nuclear states - if backed by nuclear states - count as a joint assault. It’s hard to find out whether this is another red herring by Russia, another baseless threat packed onto the 200 already said since the invasion of Ukraine. It does suggest a vapid nature to the doctrine change - but it’s not a guess you want to get wrong.
There are rumblings on the borders that give an inkling to where Russia’s headspace is at when it comes to future clashes with the West. There has been increased Russian interference in the West that has been noted in the past few weeks, with Russia being accused of severing two cables in the Baltic Sea. Russia’s so-called “hybrid warfare” has been the subject of recent conversations - the mutual defence treaty. As clashes inevitably start to occur, a question arises when defining under what circumstances NATO will invoke Article 5. Out-and-out war with NATO is logistically impossible for Russia, but the use of hybrid warfare is starting to wear out NATO states, to the point where they are considering whether the current assassinations, election meddling, and sabotage, are enough to warrant retaliation - and whether outright war is a relevant response.
Once again, looking at the historical use of nuclear weapons proves key to understanding where the chips might fall. Thankfully the Cold War never went hot, and nuclear weaponry helped with that - under the logical thinking that wiping ourselves out for a slither of land was not a helpful tradeoff. In its place, proxy wars abounded. I have already discussed some potential proxy wars in, and on either side, of the Red Sea, which the war in Ukraine influences. However, it doesn’t seem likely that proxy wars will happen in Europe, not when there is an actual war going on.
So what does the redrawing of Russia’s nuclear doctrine mean for Europe? I don’t think it necessarily means that Putin will press the button - after all, NATO members already fall under the nuclear doctrine now, having supplied long-range missiles to Ukraine in the last few weeks. What it might be used for, however, is an extreme solution that makes anything else comparatively better. NATO is already breaching Russia’s new criteria, that gives Russia a casus belli for war in Europe - but they won’t attack Germany or Poland. A better alternative is to test NATO’s mutual defence clause by going after the smaller states, such as the ones in the Baltics. The Cold War led to “salami policy” - policy slice by slice. So if Russia goes after Estonia, let’s say, using its hybrid warfare to create a cause for takeover on the former Soviet state, what will NATO do? They are contractually obliged to help, but who would want to risk nuclear war given that they are already stepping on Putin’s nuclear toes in Ukraine? Could they allow the loss of a small state like Estonia? If they do, then the NATO project is over. It all depends on how much NATO wants to gamble.
Finding History’s Rhyme Scheme
The war in Ukraine is not the start of the third world war. It is not the catalyst, the straw that breaks the camel’s back. It has more hallmarks of the Spanish Civil War, not because of ideological reasons, but because it has allowed Europe to test its new machinery and tactics, to see what works and what doesn’t, so that when Europe is embroiled in conflict, some nations would have already written the rulebook. If Ukraine has told us anything, it is that how a war was fought is no longer tenable. It's no longer about massive divisions of men and machines; it will now revolve around sections of highly technologically advanced operatives. That is the battleground of the future.
As to where it will be fought, who knows? The nuclear doctrine Putin has redrawn allows for states to directly wage war with other states, as opposed to the proxy wars of yesteryear, because it is less dangerous than the other option. But the salami policy is still in effect. In using its hybrid warfare, Russia will aim to test the boundaries of NATO by going after smaller states, like those in the Baltic or in Eastern Europe, where some leaders are already sympathetic. Conquering these states relies on just how complicated the issues within them are, giving a reasonable cause for Russian intervention - and a reasonable doubt for NATO.
The views and opinions expressed in this article belong solely to the writer and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of the Warwick Economics Summit.
References:
BBC News-
Warwick Economics Summit-
UK Government-
Ukrainian Embassy to the UK-
Air and Space Forces-
Al Jazeera-
The Economist
YouTube-
The Conversation-
The International Affairs Review-
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