When the World’s Biggest Emitters Don’t Show Up: COP 30 and the Illusions of Domestic Climate Policy

In the august halls of Belém, as COP 30 progresses, there lies a disquieting paradox: the two nations most responsible (or irresponsible) for global greenhouse gas emissions, the United States and China, seem conspicuously distant from the summit’s diplomacy. Their attenuated presence rings a somewhat ‘cautionary bell’, exposing the limitations of relying on domestic climate policy in a world that demands, more properly needs, collective action.

At first glance, the absence of American leadership from COP 30 seems rather fatalistic. The U.S., renowned for historically being the largest cumulative emitter, is opting not to dispatch a high-level delegation and instead may exert influence only tangentially.

According to Chatham House, this backsliding weakens trust in global climate cooperation and takes away from the credibility of financing pledges. By shirking its international commitments, the U.S. risks hollowing out the entire structure of multilateral climate diplomacy, one that’s taken decades to establish, even as other nations thrive in its stead.

China, by contrast, exerts a gentler but no less concerning influence. While, evidently, President Xi Jinping is not personally in attendance, his government is seen represented, and Beijing seems to be striving to project itself as a ‘green superpower’. But China’s climate credentials remain under significant scrutiny.

Where, despite ambitious aspirations, including a pledge to expand wind and solar capacity to 3,600 GW by 2035 and raise its non‑fossil fuel energy share to 30%, there remains no concrete timeline for suppressing its immense dependence on coal. Official data clearly suggests that China missed a key carbon-intensity reduction target for 2024, which has sparked concerns about whether it will meet its longer-term Paris Agreement obligations.

This retreat by the world’s top emitters is very significant. Firstly, without their full and wholehearted engagement, COP 30 risks being a performative spectacle instead of a platform for transformational change. The European Union, at the same time, appears to be left bearing the financial and political burden: with the absence of the U.S., China, and even India, Europe is increasingly isolated in its bid to provide funding for developing countries.

Such a lopsided paradigm leaves the room open for cynicism and weakens the leverage of global climate finance mechanisms precisely when vulnerable nations most need scale, trust, and reciprocity.

Secondly, the logic of ‘domestic climate policy as a substitute for robust multilateralism’ begins to unfold. The Stanford Report notes that subnational actors, city coalitions, and cross-border networks can try to sustain momentum even in the absence of the U.S., but such bottom‑up initiatives can only go so far. They lack the binding and enforcement such bottom‑up initiatives can only go so far. They lack the binding and enforcement mechanisms of a truly ‘global treaty’. Moreover, they cannot compensate for the absence of ambition on the part of the largest emitters; without their participation, the global carbon budget continues to, in a sense, lose its purpose.

Thirdly, this absence deepens fissures in equity and responsibility. As UCL analysts observed after COP 29, China continues to lean on the 1992 ‘developing country’ classification to justify its modest financial contributions, even though its cumulative carbon emissions have now overtaken those of the entirety of the European Union. This selective allusion to historical classifications diminishes the value of collective trust, especially among relatively less financially prolific nations that increasingly view climate finance as reparative justice.

The very essence of COP summits is predicated on the principle that climate change is global, systemic, and insuppressible without a coordinated intervention. When the world’s most polluting states step back, even if it means symbolically stepping back, it is a reminder that domestic policy alone is not enough.

Yes, theoretical models support this conclusion: studies in climate game theory emphasise that large-scale agreements are critical to overcoming collective-action dilemmas, especially when economic rivalries incentivise free-riding. On the other hand, a purely domestic or fragmented architecture risks fragmentation, backsliding, and simply, failure to achieve the 1.5 °C threshold.

One might argue that the diplomatic void could be filled by new leadership, like emerging economies, civil society coalitions, or non-state actors. And, there is momentum. But such substitutes, while great on the outside, cannot replicate the scale or legitimacy that comes with participation from the largest emitters. Without involvement from the U.S. and more strong, reliable leadership front expressed from China’s end, COP 30 may produce grand declarations, but it will lack the very pathways towards a truly collective future.

In the end, the absence of the biggest emitters is not simply a diplomatic snub; it is representative of a much deeper malaise in the global climate order. It exposes the open fragility of relying purely on national strategies when what the planet truly demands is shared sacrifice, shared burden, and shared trust.

The views and opinions expressed in this article belong solely to the writer and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of the Warwick Economics Summit.

Reference List

1. Chatham House, What is COP30 and why does it matter for the climate? (Chatham House)

2. Council on Foreign Relations, China’s Latest Climate Pledges Fall Short of What’s Needed at COP30 (Council on Foreign Relations)

3. Phys.org via AFP, China missed key climate target last year: official data (Phys.org)

4. Euronews, Biggest polluters skip COP30 … (euronews)

5. Stanford Report, What’s at stake for the COP30 global climate summit (Stanford News)

6. UCL, Comment: Five critical issues still left hanging after an underwhelming Cop29 (University College London)

7. bne IntelliNews / Carbon Brief analysis, China’s cumulative emissions now worse than EU’s (IntelliNews

8. Preprint study, The Impact of U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement … COP30 (Preprints)

9. Academic modelling, A well-timed switch from local to global agreements accelerates climate change mitigation (arXiv)

10. AI‑game theory modelling, AI for Global Climate Cooperation: … RICE‑N (arXiv)